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Abstract 
This paper proposes a theory in which aggregate shocks also produce idiosyncratic risk which in 
turn introduces a demand channel that we argue is relevant for understanding the Great 
Recession. We study a model in which households are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic 
employment shocks, firms set prices subject to nominal rigidities, and the labor market is 
characterized by matching frictions and by downward inflexible wages. Higher risk of job loss and 
worsening job finding prospects during unemployment depress goods demand because of a 
precautionary savings motive amongst employed households. Lower goods demand produces a 
decline in job vacancies and the ensuing drop in the job finding rate in turn triggers higher 
precautionary saving setting in motion an amplification mechanism. The amplification mechanism 
is absent from standard macroeconomic models and depends on the combination of incomplete 
financial markets and frictional goods and labor markets. The model can account for key features 
of the Great Recession in response to the observed changes in the job separation rate and an 
increase in search efficiency heterogeneity estimated from the matching function. We argue that 
the latter shock is required to reconcile the large increase in the incidence of longer term 
unemployment observed during the Great Recession. 
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1 Introduction
The U.S. and many other Western economies have still not fully recovered from the Great Recession,
the longest and deepest recession since the 1930s. The U.S. labor market outcomes during the Great
Recession have been particularly grave and have involved not only a persistent rise in the level of unem-
ployment, but also a surge in the share of longer-term unemployed workers. This paper puts forward a
macroeconomic theory of how such labor market weaknesses can motivate a decline in aggregate demand
and how this may produce an amplication mechanism. In particular, we show that a combination of
frictions in goods, labor and nancial markets, fosters an environment in which changes in job uncer-
tainty impact on goods demand due to precautionary savings against idiosyncratic employment risk and
where such changes in goods demand are transmitted to the supply side resulting in changes in labor
demand that feed back to the demand side. We apply this theory to U.S. data for the Great Recession
and argue it may have been partly responsible for the severity of the Great Recession.
We consider a model in which workers face job loss risk during employment and uncertain job
nding prospects during unemployment. Workers cannot purchase unemployment insurance contracts
and therefore have to rely on government provided unemployment benets and private savings for
consumption smoothing. In such an incomplete markets setting, changes in the risk of job loss or in the
probability of nding a new job during unemployment impact on aggregate demand through employed
workers precautionary savings. As a result, the decline in aggregate demand that can derive from
worsening labor market conditions may be far larger than the income loss of the workers that actually
su¤er a job loss.1 We embed this mechanism in a macro model with downward inexible real wages
and in which variations in aggregate demand are transmitted to the supply side because of nominal
rigidities in price setting. The introduction of nominal rigidities is a simple way of allowing uctuations
in aggregate demand to impact on equilibrium allocations while the assumption of downward rigid wages
is motivated by the lack of a decline in real wages in the U.S. during the Great Recession despite the
large increase in the number of job seekers as indicated by unemployment statistics.
We adopt a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides style matching framework of the labor market. In order
to address the surge in long-term unemployment observed in the U.S. during the Great Recession, we
extend the standard matching model with heterogeneity across workers in their job search e¢ ciency.
Specically, we assume that unemployed workers di¤er in their expected unemployment durations and
1Carroll and Dunn (1997) and Carroll, Dynan and Krane (2004) also stress the impact of labor market uncertainties
on demand due to precautionary savings.
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that these di¤erences emerge either upon job loss or during an unemployment spell which introduces
negative duration dependence of job nding rates.2 The heterogeneity in search e¢ ciency allows us
to address the surge in longer term unemployment but is also important for the amplication mecha-
nism because lower search e¢ ciency during unemployment increases the precautionary savings motive
amongst the currently employed workers.
We formalize these ideas in an Aiyagari-Huggett-type incomplete markets model with uninsurable
idiosyncratic employment and job nding risks and with multiple unemployment states. Firms are
monopolistically competitive and face quadratic costs of changing nominal prices. A scal authority
provides unemployment benets while the monetary authority sets the short-term nominal interest rate
according to a Taylor rule. We allow for aggregate shocks to the job separation rate and to the probability
that unemployed workers have low search e¢ ciency. The model is computationally very challenging but
we introduce assumptions that allow us readily to analyze its properties using a standard perturbation
approach which may be of an independent interest.
We demonstrate that the model generates a very intuitive amplication mechanism in which the
absence of insurance against idiosyncratic risk implies that an increase in individual job uncertainty -
due to higher risk of job loss and/or longer expected unemployment duration - spurs a decline in goods
demand because it motivates precautionary savings amongst the employed workers. The drop in goods
demand in turn leads rms to post fewer vacancies which impacts negatively on the job nding rate.
This interaction produces an amplication mechanism because employed workers increase their savings
even further when perceiving higher job uncertainty due to the drop in probability of nding a job should
they lose their current job. We simulate a calibrated version of the model in response to the short burst
in the rate of inow to unemployment observed in the U.S. at the onset of the Great Recession and to
a shock to the risk of becoming a low search e¢ cient unemployed worker. The latter shock is estimated
imposing a Cobb-Douglas matching function and assuming that variations in the matching function
residual derive from changes in the composition of the unemployment pool. Importantly, apart from
the specication of the matching function, this estimate relies only upon our assumptions regarding
the laws of motion of the stocks of employed and unemployed workers and is independent of all other
features of the model. We nd that, in response to these two shocks, the model produces a rise in the
unemployment rate and a drop in vacancy postings that are very similar to the empirical counterparts
observed during the Great Recession. Moreover, the model is also consistent with the movements along
2Ahn and Hamilton (2014) and Hornstein (2011) investigate the importance of duration dependence and heterogeneity
for the increase in unemployment during the Great Recession.
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and the outward shift of the Beveridge curve.
A key insight of our analysis is that it is the combination of frictions in nancial, goods and labor
markets that generates the amplication mechanism. When workers can insure against idiosyncratic
risk, labor market uncertainties have minor impact on aggregate demand because households have no
incentive to engage in precautionary savings against idiosyncratic risk thus eliminating the demand
channel. When prices are exible, price adjustments eliminate the transmission of shocks from the de-
mand side to the supply side. If wages are fully exible, the wage adjustment is su¢ cient to neutralize
the amplication mechanism unless workers have little bargaining power. We also demonstrate that
monetary policy plays an important role. In standard New Keynesian models that rest on the repre-
sentative agent assumption, aggressive changes in nominal interest rates in response to deviations of
ination from its target can eliminate the ine¢ ciencies deriving from nominal rigidities. In the heteroge-
neous agent model that we examine the impact of nominal rigidities is amplied through the aggregate
demand channel. This makes aggressive monetary policy extra e¤ective because it not only addresses
ine¢ cient variations in mark-ups but also neutralizes the aggregate demand amplication. Moreover,
we show that the local indeterminacy region of the parameter space is large and depends crucially on
agentsrisk aversion. The more risk averse are agents the more the aggregate demand channel matters
and the more aggressive does monetary policy need to be to rule out expectational equilibria.
We are not the rst to study the impact of unemployment risks on the economy. Krusell and Smith
(1999) and Krusell et al (2009) examine the impact of short-term and long-term unemployment risks
with self-insurance. Challe and Ragot (2015) study like us the impact of precautionary savings in an
incomplete markets setting. Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2015) examine an incomplete markets setting with
nominal rigidities focusing upon the impact of tightening borrowing constraints. Gornemann, Kuester
and Nakajima (2012) and McKay and Reis (2014) both study incomplete markets models with labor
and goods market frictions but focus upon very di¤erent questions from us. Gornemann, Kuester and
Nakajima (2012) examine the distributional e¤ects of monetary policy when agents face unemployment
risk while McKay and Reis (2014) focus upon the impact of automatic scal stabilizers.
Our analysis is also related to the rapidly growing literature on uncertainty shocksthat has followed
Blooms (2009) contribution. However, whilst much of the existing literature has emphasized the impact
of changes in second moments of aggregate shocks, we stress the e¤ects of changes in the rst moments
of job separation and job nding rates which trigger demand variations because of the their impact
on idiosyncratic risk.3 In our model the absence of unemployment insurance contracts implies that
3Basu and Bundick (2012) and Schaal (2012) also investigate the impact of uncertainty and news shocks in models with
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variations in the probability of job loss and in the job nding rate impact on agents perception of
idiosyncratic risk. An interesting aspect of this is that uncertainty is partially endogenous and rises in
recessions when the job nding rate typically is low. We show that these uncertainty e¤ects may be of
rst-order importance in a macro setting when combined with frictions in goods and labor markets.4
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the labor market impact of
the Great Recession. In Section 3 we present the model. Section 4 examines the quantitative properties
of the model and provides an analysis of the Great Recession. Section 5 provides some robustness
analysis. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 The Great Recession and the Labor Market
The nancial crisis produced one of the longest and deepest recessions in U.S. history. According to
the NBER, the contraction lasted 18 months (December 2007 - June 2009), the longest since the Great
Depression. The Great Recession also triggered a major deterioration of labor market conditions.5
The unemployment rate rose from 4.7 percent in July 2007 to 10 percent by October 2009, and has
subsequently remained stubbornly high, see Figure 1. The increase in unemployment witnessed during
this episode is large but not out of line with previous U.S. recessions. In the early 1980s recession, for
example, the unemployment rate peaked at 10.8 percent and the OPEC I recession saw it rising to 9
percent. However, compared to other recessions, the rise in unemployment has been very stubborn and
7 years after the onset of the recession, the unemployment rate is still well above its pre-recession level.
The ows in and out of unemployment provide a useful way to gain some further insight into the
determinants of the change in unemployment. We measure the average instantaneous job nding rate,
pft , and the average job separation rate, p
l
t as:
pft =
mt
ut 1
plt =
et
nt 1
where ut is the level of unemployment, nt the stock of employment, mt the ow of workers from
unemployment to employment, and et the number of (permanent) job separations. All data were
labor market frictions but concentrate on changes in second moments of aggregate shocks.
4Leduc and Liu (2013) provide time-series evidence that changes in uncertainty impact on aggregate demand and
argue that labor market risks are important determinants of risk.
5See Daly et al (2011), Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin (2010), Hall (2010), Katz (2010), and Rothstein (2011) for excellent
discussions of the labor market during the Great Recession.
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obtained from the Current Population Study (CPS) apart from et which we got from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
Figure 2 illustrates pft and p
l
t. The initial rise in unemployment was triggered by a rapid increase in
the unemployment inow rate in the period from early 2008 to late 2009. However, the persistence of
the rise in the level of unemployment derives from a large and stubborn decline in the unemployment
outow rate which drops dramatically during 2009 and since recovers only marginally. Thus, the main
issue that needs explaining is how the recession produced such a large and persistent drop in the job
nding rate and this is one of the main targets of the model that we construct in Section 3.
A key aspect of the labor market impact of the Great Recession is the surge in the incidence of longer
term unemployment. Figure 3 illustrates the time-series for the share of unemployed workers who have
been out of work for 6 months or more. In the postwar sample prior to the Great Recession, the share
of longer term unemployed displays moderately countercyclical movements with its highest level of 26
percent occurring in the early 1980s recession. During the Great Recession instead, this indicator of
longer term unemployment surged from 17.5 percent in August 2007 to 45.3 percent in April 2010 and
it still hovers well above 30 percent, see also Rothstein (2011) and Wiczer (2013).
The data suggest that the rise in longer term unemployment is related to increased heterogeneity of
job nding prospects amongst the unemployed. Perhaps the simplest way of seeing this is to compare
the average duration of unemployment with the inverse of the instantaneous job nding rate. Suppose
that the job nding rate is constant within a month and that all unemployed face the same probability
of nding a job. In this case the law of motion for average duration of unemployment, dt, can be
formulated as:
dt =

1  pft

(dt 1 + 1)
ut 1
ut
+ plt
nt 1
ut
(1)
In the non-stochastic steady-state d = 1=pf where pf is the long-run value of the job nding rate.6
Thus, under the assumption of homogenous search e¢ ciency, the average duration of unemployment
in the data should be close to the inverse of the instantaneous job nding rate unless there are large
shocks to the ows in and out of unemployment.
Figure 4 illustrates the time-series of average unemployment duration in the United States together
with the inverse of the average instantaneous job nding rate and the estimate of average unemploy-
ment duration derived from (1). The inverse job nding rate tracks the BLS estimate of the average
unemployment duration very closely until the Great Recession. From the end of 2007, however, the
6To see this note that d =
 
1  pf =pf +  pl=pf (n=u) and that n=u = pf=pl.
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two graphs deviate very signicantly and the BLS estimate of unemployment duration rises approxi-
mately twice as much as the inverse of the job nding rate. This result indicates either measurement
error, and/or the impact of large shocks and/or that there is heterogeneity in the search e¢ ciency of
the unemployed. We can check for the importance of large shocks by drawing a comparison with the
estimated unemployment duration derived from (1). This estimate is essentially identical to the inverse
of the job nding rate. Thus, we conclude that the increase in duration observed in the U.S. during the
Great Recession requires one to allow for heterogeneous job nding prospects and/or consider sources
of measurement error. We will concentrate on the rst of these.
Another much discussed feature of the Great Recession is its impact on the Beveridge curve. Figure 5
illustrates the relationship between vacancies and unemployment using CPS estimates of unemployment
and JOLTS estimates of the number of vacancies. We discriminate between the pre-Great Recession
period and the period thereafter (from 2007:12). During the early parts of the recession, unemployment
approximately doubled while the number of vacancies fell by around 50 percent which jointly produced
a striking movement down the Beveridge curve. In the course of the initial part of the recession, the
labor market conditions worsened considerably but the dynamics of unemployment and vacancies appear
consistent with the pre-crisis Beveridge curve. From late 2009, however, there is instead evidence that
the Beveridge curve shifted outwards, indicating a less e¢ cient matching between workers looking for
employment and rms looking for new hires, see also Barlevy (2011).
We take away from this that the persistent decline in the job nding rate is key for understanding the
large and persistent decline in unemployment during the Great Recession, that the increase in average
unemployment duration is related to an increase in heterogeneity amongst the unemployed, and that
there have been substantial movements along the Beveridge curve followed by an outward shift in this
relationship. We will construct a model and ask whether it is consistent with these observations and
whether the labor market weaknesses may have been a key factor behind the severity of the recession.
3 Model
We consider a heterogenous agents economy with frictions in nancial, labor and goods markets. The
economy consists of workers, rms owned by entrepreneurs, and a government which is in charge of
monetary and scal policies.
Workers. There is a continuum of mass 1 of workers indexed by i 2 (0; 1). Workers are risk averse,
innitely lived, and maximize the expected present value of their utility streams.
6
A worker is either working or unemployed. Employed workers (indexed by ri;t = n) earn a real
wage wt but lose their current job with probability t 2 [0; 1]. Unemployed workers search for jobs and
receive unemployment benets  < wt. There are two types of unemployed workers which di¤er in their
search e¢ ciency and therefore in their job nding probabilities, r;t. Unemployed workers with high
search e¢ ciency (ri;t = s) face a shorter expected unemployment spell than unemployed workers with
low search e¢ ciency (ri;t = l), 0  l;t  s;t  1. Upon job loss, a newly unemployed worker enters
the high search e¢ ciency pool with probability 's;t 2 [0; 1], and the low search e¢ ciency pool with the
complement probability 'l;t = 1   's;t. Moreover, during an unemployment spell type s unemployed
workers risk making a transition to type l, an event that occurs with probability !t 2 [0; 1]. The
model therefore includes two sources of heterogeneity in job nding rates, unobserved heterogeneity
and negative duration dependence both of which imply that workers who have been unemployed for
longer periods on average have lower job nding rates than newly unemployed workers.7
The timing is as follows. At the beginning of the period, the aggregate labor market shocks are
realized. After this, unemployed workers and rms with job vacancies match and new employment
relationships are established. This is followed by production and consumption. At the end of the
period, job separations are e¤ectuated. Thus, employed workers face idiosyncratic uncertainty about
the identity of job losers and about their search e¢ ciency should they lose their jobs. By the same
token, unemployed workers face idiosyncratic risk about the identity of current and future job nders
and high search e¢ ciency unemployed workers also risk making a transition to low search e¢ ciency.8
Workers cannot purchase unemployment insurance contracts. Consumption smoothing is accom-
plished through government provided unemployment benets and through self-insurance by saving in a
riskless nominal bond, bhi;t. Workers maximize utility subject to the following borrowing constraint and
sequence of budget constraints:
bhi;t  bmin; t  0 (2)
ci;t + b
h
i;t = ni;twt + (1  ni;t)  +
Rt 1
1 + t
bhi;t 1; t  0 (3)
where bmin is a borrowing limit, ci;t denotes a consumption basket, Rt 1 is the gross nominal interest
7See also Barnichon and Figura (2012), Hornstein (2012), Krusell and Smith (1999) and Krusell et al (2009), for models
with multiple unemployment states.
8Of course, households also face idiosyncratic uncertainty about the identity of future job losers.
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rate, t denotes the net ination rate in period t. ni;t indicates the households employment state:
ni;t =
8<: 1 if worker i is employed in period t0 if worker i is unemployed in period t
Let V
 
bhi ; ri;S

be the expected present discounted utility of a household given its bond holdings,
its labor market status, ri, and the aggregate state vector, S. The Bellman equation for an employed
household is given as:
V

bhi ; n;S

= max
ci;bh0i
fU (ci) + E
0@1  X
g=s;l
'g
 
1  0g
1AV bh0i ; n;S0
+E
X
g=s;l
'g
 
1  0g

V

bh0i ; g;S
0

g (4)
subject to the borrowing constraint and to the budget constraint in equation (3) setting ni = 1. U is
an increasing and strictly concave utility function.  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor, and E is
the conditional expectations operator. The terms on the right hand side of (4) are (i) the instantaneous
utility ow U (ci), (ii) the probability of being employed next period (1  
P
g=s;l 'g
 
1  0g

) times
the continuation value of being employed, and (iii) the probability of being state g unemployed next
period ('g
 
1  0g

) times the respective continuation values.
The Bellman equation for a type s unemployed worker is:
V

bhi ; s;S

= max
ci;bh0i
fU (ci) + E (1  !)
h
0sV

bh0i ; n;S
0

+
 
1  0s

V

bh0i ; s;S
0
i
+E!
h
0lV

bh0i ; n;S
0

+
 
1  0l

V

bh0i ; l;S
0
i
g (5)
subject to (2) and (3) setting ni = 0. A type s unemployed worker remains type s with probability
(1  !) and in that case nds a job with probability 0s, and makes a transition to type l with probability
! and then nds a job with probability 0l. This last transition incorporates the possibility of negative
duration dependence.
Finally, the Bellman equation for a type l unemployed workers is given as:
V

bhi ; l;S

= max
ci;bh0i
fU (ci) + E
h
0lV

bh0i ; n;S
0

+
 
1  0l

V

bh0i ; l;S
0
i
g (6)
subject to (2) and (3) setting ni = 0.
The two Bellman equations (5) and (6) di¤er because the two types have di¤erent job nding
prospects and because only type s unemployed workers face the risk of making a transition to a less
e¢ cient search state. Since w > , V
 
bh; n;S
  V  bh; s;S for all bh and S so that no employed
8
household has an incentive to voluntarily leave their current job. Under the condition that 0s  0l,
V
 
bh; s;S
  V  bh; l;S for all bh and S.
The consumption index ci is a basket of consumption goods varieties:
ci =
Z
j

cji
1 1=
dj
1=(1 1=)
(7)
where cji is household is consumption of goods of variety j and  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
between consumption goods. Household is demand for variety j is given as:
cji =

Pj
P
 
ci (8)
where Pj is the nominal price of variety j and P is a price index:
P =
Z
j
P1 j dj
1=(1 )
(9)
Entrepreneurs. Consumption goods are produced by a continuum of measure 	 < 1 of monop-
olistically competitive rms indexed by j 2 (0;	) which are owned by risk neutral entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs discount utility at the rate  and make decisions on the pricing of their goods, on va-
cancy postings, and on their consumption and savings policies. In return for managing (and owning)
the rm, they are the sole claimants to its prots. We assume that entrepreneurs can save but face
a no-borrowing constraint. This no-borrowing constraint implies that the entrepreneur nances hiring
costs through retained earnings.9
Entrepreneurs make all their decisions simultaneously but we can separate them into the hiring and
pricing decisions made when acting as rm owners and the consumption and savings choices made when
acting as households. Output is produced according to a linear technology:
yj;t = nj;t (10)
where nj;t denotes entrepreneur js input of labor purchased from the workers. Firms hire labor in a
frictional labor market. The law of motion for employment in rm j is given as:
nj;t =
 
1  t 1

nj;t 1 + hj;t (11)
hj;t =  tvj;t (12)
9 In the stationary equilibrium,  < 1= (R= ((1 + ))) so entrepreneurs will be borrowing constrained. This derives from
the assumption that households are risk averse while entrepreneurs are assumed risk neutral.
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where hj;t denotes hires made by rm j in period t, vj;t is vacancies posted, and  t is the job lling
probability. Firms are assumed to be su¢ ciently large that  t can be interpreted as the fraction of
vacancies that leads to a hire.10 The cost of posting a vacancy is given by  > 0. Real marginal costs
are therefore:
mcj;t = wt +

 t
  Et

(1  t)

 t+1

(13)
Following Rotemberg (1982), rms face quadratic costs of price adjustment. Given risk neutrality,
entrepreneurs set prices to maximize the present discounted value of prots:
Et
1X
s=0
s
 
Pj;t+s
Pt+s
 mcj;t+s

yj;t+s   
2

Pj;t+s  Pj;t+s 1
Pj;t+s 1
2
yt
!
(14)
subject to:
yj;t =

Pj;t
Pt
 
yt (15)
Equation (15) is the demand for goods variety j. yt, can be interpreted as aggregate real income. In
equation (14)   0 indicates the severity of nominal rigidities in price setting with  = 0 corresponding
to exible prices. The rst-order condition for this problem is given as:
1   + mcj;t Pt
Pj;t

yj;t = 
Pt
Pj;t 1

Pj;t  Pj;t 1
Pj;t 1

yt
 Et
" 
Pj;t+1
P2j;t
!
Pj;t+1  Pj;t
Pj;t

Ptyt+1
#
(16)
The entrepreneursconsumption and savings decisions are the solutions to the following dynamic
programming problem:
W
 
bej ;nj ;S

= max
dj ;be0j ;hj

dj + EW
 
be0j ;n
0
j ;S
0	 (17)
subject to the employment transition equation and the budget and borrowing constraints:
dj + b
e0
j +wnj + 
hj
 
=
Pj
P
nj  Te + R 1
1 + 
bej (18)
be0j  0 (19)
where dj denotes entrepreneur js consumption and be0j their bond purchases. Condition (19) imposes
the no-borrowing constraint on entrepreneurs. Te denotes a lump-sum tax imposed on employers to
cover the government provided unemployment benets.
10This assumption - which is equivalent to assuming that 	 is su¢ ciently smaller than 1, can be relaxed which would
produce ex-post heterogeneity across rms.
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Labor Market. We assume that wt  w as long as w is consistent with the joint match surplus being
non-negative and with workers preferring to work rather than being unemployed.11 The assumption
of downward wage rigidity squares well with the U.S. experience during the Great Recession which
witnessed wages failing to fall below their pre-recession level. We will later investigate the importance
of this assumption.
The matching technology is given as:
mt = % (ua;t)
 (vt)
1  (20)
wheremt denotes the measure of matches at date t, and vt is the aggregate measure of vacancies posted
by the rms. % > 0, and  2 (0; 1) are constant parameters. ua;t is a measure of the number of e¤ective
(active) searchers at the beginning of the period:
ua;t =
 
(1  !t 1)us;t 1 + t 1's;t 1nt 1

+ q
 
ul;t 1 +
 
!t 1us;t 1 + t 1'l;t 1nt 1

(21)
where ur;t is the measure of type r unemployed workers at date t. q 2 (0; 1] is the probability that a type
l unemployed worker is searching for a job at date t and is an indicator of relative search e¢ ciency. When
q < 1, type l unemployed workers face longer expected unemployment spells than type s unemployed
workers.
The job lling probability and the job nding probabilities are given as:
 t = %
 
t (22)
s;t = %
1 
t (23)
l;t = qs;t (24)
where t = vt=ua;t denotes labor market tightness. The laws of motion of the stocks of employed and
unemployed workers are given as:
nt =
 
1  t 1

nt 1 +mt (25)
us;t =
 
1  s;t
  
(1  !t 1)us;t 1 + t 1's;t 1nt 1

(26)
ul;t =
 
1  l;t
  
ul;t 1 +
 
!t 1us;t 1 + t 1'l;t 1nt 1

(27)
Government. The government is in charge of monetary and scal policies. We assume that the
government balances the budget period-by-period:
ut = 	T
e
t (28)
11We have checked that the match surplus is positive for all matches in all the results that we report.
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where ut = us;t + ul;t.
Monetary policy is specied by a rule for the short-term nominal interest rate:
Rt = R

1 + t
1 + 

(29)
where R is the long-run nominal interest rate target,  is the ination target, and  denotes the (semi-)
elasticity of the nominal interest rate to deviations of ination from its target.
Stochastic Shocks. We allow for shocks to the job separation rate12, t, to 'l;t, the stochastic variable
which determines the share of job losers who ow into the two types of unemployment, and to !t which
determines the probability of search e¢ ciency loss during an unemployment spell. We assume that:
t = + z;t (30)
'l;t = 'l + z';t (31)
!t = ! + z!;t (32)
z;t = z;t 1 + ";t (33)
z';t = 'z';t 1 + "';t (34)
z!;t = !z!;t 1 + "!;t (35)
where ;'l;! 2 (0; 1) determine the steady-state values of the stochastic variables and ;';! 2
( 1; 1) their persistence. We assume that "t  N (0;V") where "t = (";t; "';t; "!;t)0. ";t is assumed
orthogonal to "';t and "!;t while these two latter shocks may be correlated.
We take no rm stand on the sources of the shocks to search e¢ ciency, "';t and "!;t. Hall (2014)
argues that the composition of job losers during the Great Recession shifted towards those with on
average smaller job nding rates which would be consistent with a positive innovation to "';t. Sahin
et al (2014) document an increase in mis-matchbetween vacancies and job seekers in the dimensions
of occupations and industries during the Great Recession which would be another source of a positive
innovation to "';t. Kroft et al (2014) instead document an increase in negative duration dependence
after 2008 as would be consistent with innovations to either "';t or "!;t. Sterk (2015) suggests that
12The assumption that the job separation rate is exogenous is made only for simplicity and it would be feasible to allow
for endogenous separations by e.g. introducing match specic shocks, see Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). However, we
nd it useful to assume exogenous job separations as this set-up can be thought of as capturing the impact of a variety
of di¤erent shocks (such as productivity shocks, nancial shocks, idiosyncratic demand shocks) through a single shock
allowing us to focus on the amplication mechanism which is our main interest in this paper.
12
falling house prices may have limited labor mobility during the Great Recession adding another source
of increase in 'l;t and !t.
13 In short, there are multiple reasons for why heterogeneity in job nding
prospects may have gone up during the Great Recession. Our approach is to capture these through 'l;t
and !t and analyze the extent to which their impact under some circumstances may be amplied.
Equilibrium. We focus upon a recursive equilibrium in which workers act competitively taking all
prices for given while rms act as monopolistic competitors setting the price of their own variety taking
all other prices for given. In equilibrium, rms will be symmetric because of the absence of idiosyncratic
productivity shocks, state contingent pricing and because we assume that they are large enough that
job separation and vacancy lling probabilities can be treated like fractions. We denote relative prices
by pj;t = Pj;t=Pt and note that symmetry implies that the equilibrium relative price equals 1 for all
goods. In the symmetric equilibrium, the optimal price setting condition therefore simplies to:
1   + mct = t (1 + t)  Et

t+1 (1 + t+1)
yt+1
yt

(36)
As is well-known, models with incomplete markets and aggregate shocks are cumbersome to solve
numerically. In this paper we follow Krusell, Mukoyama and Smith (2011) and impose that the bor-
rowing constraint bmin = 0. Under this assumption there is no aggregate savings vehicle available to
workers and, in equilibrium, since unemployed workers cannot issue debt, all workers consume their
income every period. Nonetheless, since employed workers face the risk of losing their job, they have an
incentive to save and will therefore be on their Euler equations. For the same reason, although workers
cannot save in equilibrium, the model still features a precautionary savings motive and this will impact
on equilibrium quantities through the real interest rate which will have to adjust to induce employed
workers not to save. The great advantage of imposing this borrowing constraint is that the aggregate
wealth distribution is degenerate which simplies the computational aspects of the model very consid-
erably. Moreover, Ravn and Sterk (2012) nd that allowing for individual savings - and therefore for
a non-degenerate wealth distribution - has only limited impact on aggregate dynamics. The aggregate
state vector under the bmin = 0 borrowing constraint is given as St =
 
ul;t;us;t;t;'s;t;!t

which does
not involve the wealth distribution.
We let c
 
bh; r;S

and bh0
 
bh; r;S

denote the decision rules that solve the workers problems
(depending on their labor market status), and h (be;n;S) ; d (be;n;S) and be0 (be;n;S) the solutions
to the entrepreneursproblem. We can now dene the equilibrium formally:
13The idea here is that geographical mobility (and therefore job nding rates) may have declined for households which
experienced low or negative equity due to falling house prices.
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Denition 1 A recursive monopolistic competition equilibrium is dened as a state vector S, pricing
kernels (w (S) ; (S)), decision rules
 
c
 
bh; r;S

;bh0
 
bh; r;S

r=n;s;l
; (d (be;n;S) ;be0 (be;n;S) ;h (be;n;S))
and pj (be;n;S), value functions
 
Vn
 
bh;S

;Vu;s
 
bh;S

;Vu;l
 
bh;S

andW (be;n;S), and govern-
ment policies (Te (S) ;R (S)) such that
(i) given the pricing kernel, the government policies, and the aggregate and individual states, the house-
hold decision rules solve the workers problems;
(ii) given the pricing kernel, government policies, and the aggregate state, the entrepreneur decision
rules solve the entrepreneursproblem and pj (be;n;S) = 1 for all j and all (be;n;S);
(iii) asset, goods and labor markets clear:
0 =
Z
i
bh0i

bhi ; ri;S

di+	
Z
j
be0j
 
bej ;nj ;S

dj = 0
y   v 
2
2y =
Z
i
chi

bhi ; ri;S

di+	
Z
j
dj
 
bej ;nj ;S

dj
y =
Z
i
nhi diZ
j
hj
 
bej ;nj ;S

dj = % (ua;t)
 (vt)
1 
nt =
 
1  t 1

nt 1 + % (ua;t) (vt)1 
ua;t =
 
(1  !t 1)us;t 1 + t 1's;t 1nt 1

+ q
 
ul;t 1 +
 
!t 1us;t 1 + t 1'l;t 1nt 1

us;t =
 
1  s;t
  
(1  !t 1)us;t 1 + t 1's;t 1nt 1

ul;t =
 
1  l;t
  
ul;t 1 +
 
!t 1us;t 1 + t 1'l;t 1nt 1

(iv) the government budget constraint is satised and the nominal interest is given by the policy rule in
equation (29) :
4 Quantitative Results
4.1 Calibration
We solve the model numerically using a standard perturbation approach (see the Appendix for details).
The calibration targets and parameter values are summarized in Tables 1 and 2.
One model period corresponds to a calendar month. The household utility function is assumed to
be given as:
U (ci;t) =
c1 i;t   1
1   ;   0
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 is the degree of relative risk aversion which matters for the household savings response to uncertainty.
We set  = 1:5 which is in the mid-range of empirical estimates of Attanasio and Weber (1995),
Eichenbaum, Hansen, and Singleton (1988), and many others who have examined either household data
or aggregate time series. We assume an annual real interest rate of 5 percent in the steady state and
set the subjective discount factor equal to 0:992 for both workers and entrepreneurs. This value is
low relative to standard representative agent models but because of idiosyncratic risk and incomplete
markets, agents have a strong incentive to engage in precautionary savings and a low real interest rate
is required to induce zero savings in equilibrium.
When calibrating the parameters pertaining to the labor market we must confront the issue that
the two types of unemployment are not directly observable.14 We address this issue by calibrating the
relevant parameters on the basis of information on labor market statistics that are informative about
the moments of interest. We target a steady-state unemployment rate of 5 percent. The parameters
(q;'s;!) and the steady-state job nding probability for type s unemployed workers, s, are calibrated
by targeting the following moments: First, according to CPS data for the post 1970 sample, on average
15 percent of job losers experience unemployment spells of 6 months or more. Secondly, the monthly
hazard rate for the newly unemployed is 43 percent, see Rothstein (2011). Third, we introduce in-
formation on duration dependence from Kroft et als (2013) estimate of the relationship between job
nding probabilities and the length of an unemployment spell. These authors estimate the job nding
probability of individuals out of work for d months at date t using a polynomial specication for the
hazard. In particular, they assume that the job nding rate depends on the length of the unemployment
spell and on labor market tightness as:
t (t; d) = A (d)m0
1 
t
A (d) = (1  a1   a2) + a1e b1d + a2e b2d
Using panel data from the CPS for the 2002-2007 sample (and controlling for demographic variables),
Kroft el al (2013) estimate ba1 = 0:314, ba2 = 0:393, bb1 = 1:085 and bb2 = 0:055. We target the implied
values of the relative hazard, A (d) =A (0), for integer values of d going up to 15 months.
We nd that q = 0:468, 'l = 0:229; ! = 0:219 and s = 0:586. Thus, 77 percent of job losers are
estimated to ow into the high search e¢ ciency state upon job loss and thereafter face a moderate risk
of 22 percent per month of loss of search e¢ ciency during unemployment. Unemployed workers with
14Although type s unemployed workers have shorter expected unemployment spells than type l unemployed workers,
some of the type s unemployed will be out of work for extended periods due to bad luck.
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high search e¢ ciency are more than twice as likely to nd a job as low search e¢ ciency unemployed
workers implying that the unemployment state has a substantial impact on the expected unemployment
duration. In the steady-state, these parameter values imply that the average duration of the stock of
type s unemployed workers is 1.48 months, that the corresponding number for type l unemployed workers
is 4.10 months while the share of unemployed workers out of work for 6 months or more is 15.9 percent.
The calibration matches closely the hazard function estimated by Kroft et als (2013).15 Finally, to
match the 5 percent unemployment rate, we set the steady-state job separation rate () equal to 3.9
percent per month.
The benet level, , is calibrated by targeting a decline in consumption of 11:7 percent upon unem-
ployment, a value which corresponds to Hurd and Rohwedders (2010) estimate of the average household
spending impact of a job loss.16 We assume that the matching function elasticity to unemployment, ,
is equal to 65 percent and we normalize % = 1. , the vacancy cost parameter, is calibrated by targeting
an average hiring cost of 4:5 percent of the quarterly wage bill per worker. Given other parameters, this
implies that  = 0:19.
We set the average mark-up equal to 20 percent which implies that , the elasticity of substitution
between goods, is equal to 6. , the parameter that determines the importance of price adjustment
costs, is calibrated to match a price adjustment frequency of 5 months. This value is conservative but
consistent with the estimates of Bils and Klenow (2004).17 This implies that  = 96:9. We assume
that the governments ination target  = 0 so that it pursues price stability and we set  = 1:5, a
conventional value in the new Keynesian literature.
Finally, we estimate the parameters of the stochastic processes for t, 'l;t and !t. The persistence
of t and the variance of its innovation are estimated using JOLTS data on layo¤s and BLS estimates of
the employment rate for a sample ranging from 2003 to 2014.18 We nd b = 0:91 and bv= = 0:0067.
To estimate the persistence and volatility of 'l;t and !t we must again confront the issue that search
e¢ ciency is unobserved. However, we can use the model to back outprocesses for these two stochastic
15Figure A.1 in the Appendix illustrates the hazard function implied by our model evaluated in the steady-state together
with Kroft et als (2013) estimates.
16See http://www.nber.org/papers/w16407.pdf?new_window=1; Table 21. Browning and Crossley (2001) estimate a
similar average consumption loss due to unemployment shocks in Canadian household data.
17To be precise, we calibrate  by exploiting the equivalence between the log-linearized Phillips curve implied by our
model and the Phillips curve implied by the Calvo model.
18Our analysis focuses on the Great Recession and its aftermath and we choose the sample period accordingly.
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shocks given the above estimate of the relative search e¢ ciency, q, the matching function parameters,
% and , and data on the unemployment outow rate and labor market tightness. It follows from the
matching function that:
ua;t = ut 1
et
%
1= vt
ut 1
1 1=
(37)
where et is the average job nding rate amongst the stock of unemployed. We further assume pro-
portionality between 'l;t and !t which implies that the disturbances to these two ows are perfectly
correlated and proportional, i.e. !'l z!;t = z';t. Under this assumption, we can use the estimates of ua;t
together with the transition equations (26)  (27) to derive estimates of 's;t and !t, see Appendix 2 for
details, from which we can estimate the persistence and variance of the two shocks. Using data from
JOLTS and the CPS (for the 2003-2014 sample) we nd b' = b! = 0:99 and bv'='l = bv!=! = 0:072.19
4.2 Results
The Impact of Labor Market Shocks. We start by examining the impact of job separation shocks
and changes in the composition of unemployed workers. We compare the results of the benchmark
economy with two alternative economies. In the rst of these we assume that prices are exible ( = 0)
but retain the incomplete markets assumption. Comparing this economy with the benchmark model is
informative about the extent to which nominal rigidities matter for the transmission mechanism. In the
second alternative economy we assume that individuals can insure against idiosyncratic shocks within
large families (but retain the presence of nominal rigidities). In this alternative economy there is risk
sharing within the family so consumption is equalized across household members independently of their
labor market status which allows us to understand the extent to which idiosyncratic risk is important
for our results. In the risk sharing model the family maximizes utility subject to the single budget
constraint:
ct + b
h
t = ntwt + (1  nt)  +
Rt 1
1 + t
bht 1; t  0
where nt is the fraction of employed household members in period t.
Figure 6 illustrates the responses of key aggregate variables to a one standard deviation increase
in the probability of job loss. Variations in the job termination rate have only moderate e¤ects on
19Since the frequency of the data is monthly, measured job openings and layo¤s are rather noisy. To avoid very erratic
shocks, we pre-smooth the data using a 6 month moving average lter. The parameters of the shock processes are obtained
by regressing the shock variables on their values lagged with one year. We then compute the monthly persistence parameters
that are implied by the regressions.
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equilibrium unemployment in standard matching models because rising unemployment implies declining
job lling costs which triggers higher vacancy postings. In the benchmark model we instead nd that
an increase in job separations produces a large increase in unemployment. Relative to the increase in
the job separation rate, unemployment rises a lot in the benchmark economy and in a very persistent
manner which also produces a surge in the share of longer term unemployed workers.20 Thus, not only
do workers see the job loss risk rising, but they also experience a worsening of job nding prospects
during unemployment.
Figure 7 repeats the analysis for a joint one standard deviations increase in 's;t and in !t. This
combination of shocks generates a decrease in average search e¢ ciency because a larger proportion
of job losers ow into type l unemployment and because a larger share of the existing high search
e¢ ciency unemployed workers su¤er a loss of search e¢ ciency. We nd that these shocks also produce
a persistent increase in both the level of unemployment and in the share of longer term unemployed
workers. Similarly to the job separation shock, the decline in search e¢ ciency leads to a persistent
decline in vacancy postings and in the job nding rate.
In order to understand better the results it is instructive to consider the Euler equation for employed
workers and the rst order condition for price setting:
@U (cn) =@cn = E
R
1 + 0
f 1   's  1  0s+ (1 's)  1  0l @U  cn0 =@cn0
+'s
 
1  0s

@U
 
cu;s0

=@cu;s0 +  (1 's)
 
1  0l

@U

cu;l0

=@cu;l0g (38)
1   + 

w +

 
  E (1  x)

 0

=  (1 + )   E  1 + 00y0
y
(39)
where cn denotes the consumption level of an employed worker, cu;s is consumption of a high search
e¢ ciency unemployed worker and cu;l is the consumption level of an unemployed worker with low search
e¢ ciency.
Employed workers are on their Euler equation because they have an incentive to save. Increased
risk of job loss (higher ) stimulate higher desired savings because it implies lower expected income and
because of increased idiosyncratic employment risk. Declining search e¢ ciency (lower 's) and worsening
job nding prospects during unemployment (lower 
0
s or 
0
l) imply longer expected unemployment spells
and therefore also trigger a decrease in expected household income and an increase in idiosyncratic
income risk both of which stimulate savings. Thus, when labor market conditions worsen, employed
workersdemand for consumption goods falls at the current real interest rate.
20The increase in job separations produces an initial short-lived drop in the fraction of long-term unemployed workers
because of the inow of newly unemployed workers.
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Equation (39) is the optimal price setting condition in the symmetric equilibrium and it relates
ination to real marginal costs and to growth in aggregate output. Due to nominal rigidities (as
indexed by ), rms nd it optimal to phase in changes in the optimal price level gradually over time.
Adverse labor market conditions impact negatively on aggregate goods demand for the reasons just
discussed. In response to the drop in goods demand, it therefore follows that ination must fall which
needs to be accompanied by lower marginal costs. Since the real wage is assumed downward inexible,
a fall in marginal costs has to come through a decline in the cost of hiring which requires the job lling
rate,  , to increase. Thus, vacancy postings have to fall which explains the persistent drop in the job
nding rate. Finally, in response to the decline in ination, the central bank cuts nominal interest rates
su¢ ciently strongly to generate a drop in the real interest rate.
Thus, the model produces a simple and intuitive amplication mechanism in which labor market
shocks trigger declining goods demand which are transmitted to the supply side and produce a fall in
labor demand. It is this transmission mechanism from the demand side to the supply side that produces
amplication because fewer vacancies further depress labor market conditions and therefore stimulate
a further fall in goods demand.21
The transmission mechanism depends crucially on the combination of nominal rigidities in price
setting and on the lack of insurance against unemployment. To see this, Figures 5 and 6 also report the
impact of the labor market shocks for the two alternative economies described above. When prices are
exible, job separation shocks have little impact on unemployment and lead only to a minor increase
in incidence of longer term unemployment. In this economy, price exibility neutralizes the need for a
fall in marginal costs and rms take advantage of low hiring costs (due to the increase in unemploy-
ment) to post more vacancies. The job nding rate therefore falls only marginally which stops the
amplication mechanism that operates in the benchmark economy. When the fraction of low search
e¢ ciency unemployed workers increases, it becomes more costly to ll vacancies because the job lling
rate declines. For that reason, this shock leads to a decline in vacancy postings which depresses the
job nding rate and spurs precautionary savings. However, price exibility once again eliminates the
need for a large decrease in vacancies and there is therefore no amplication of the shock. Thus, even if
workers are exposed to idiosyncratic risk, price exibility implies limited impact of deteriorating labor
market conditions.
21The no-borrowing constraint that we have imposed implies that the real interest rate does the full adjustment but it
should be understood that the transmission mechanism is one in which demand contracts in response to worsening labor
market conditions.
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When workers can insure against idiosyncratic employment shocks through risk sharing within large
families changing labor market conditions no longer impact on idiosyncratic risk and savings are therefore
determined only by intertemporal considerations. An increase in the job separation rate impacts little
on the household because its e¤ect on expected family income is minor. For that reason, aggregate
demand is rather unresponsive to changes in the job separation rate in the economy with insurance.
The intertemporal savings motive is also small in the case of shocks to the share of low e¢ ciency
searchers and the presence of insurance within the family eliminates the precautionary savings e¤ect.
Thus, there is therefore little amplication of labor market shocks when households can insure against
idiosyncratic risk.
In summary, the amplication mechanism that arises in the benchmark economy derives from the
combination of nominal rigidities and the lack of insurance against idiosyncratic risk. Nominal rigidities
produces a channel through which variations in goods demand impact on job creation while the lack of
job insurance implies that changes in job prospects impact on goods demand.
The Great Recession. We now examine the extent to which the mechanisms of the model may be
important for understanding key features of the Great Recession. We derive estimates of the sequences
of the shocks, (";t; "';t; "!;t)
2014:8
t=2007:1 and we feed them into the model to produce counterfactual experi-
ments. ";t is estimated by matching the observed U.S. time-series on the employment-to-unemployment
transition rate while "';t and "!;t are estimated using the same model freeapproach as above on the
basis of BLS and JOLTS data by matching the observed matching function residual. In order to avoid
having too erratic shocks, we smooth both data series with a 6 months moving average lter. We then
feed the resulting shock processes into the model economy and simulate it in response to this particular
sequence of shocks.
The upper panels of Figure 8 illustrate the shocks that we estimate for the Great Recession. As
discussed in Section 2, the Great Recession witnessed a spur of job separations which started in early
2008, peaked in early 2009, and lasted only until the end of that year. The shock to search e¢ ciency
is estimated to be much more persistent. We nd a steady rise in the share of new job losers that ow
into low search e¢ ciency and in the share of high search e¢ ciency workers that experience a drop in
search e¢ ciency. The drop in the average search e¢ ciency starts in 2008 and continues throughout
2009/10 peaking in early 2011 and thereafter slowly diminishes. It is useful to compare this shock to
search heterogeneity with other measures. For that purpose we also illustrate "m;t:
"m;t = log
 
1
%

mt
ut 1
1= vt
ut 1
1 1=!
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"m;t is the matching function residual estimated by an econometrician who (wrongly) assumes homo-
geneous search e¢ ciency amongst the unemployed. The implied matching function residuals are very
similar to the estimates of Barlevy (2011) and correspond to a 40-45 percent adverse shock to the
matching function over the 2007-2011 period and a 20 percent recovery thereafter. We also illustrate
the fraction of newly unemployed workers who report to be permanent job losers. As argued by
Hall and Schulhofer-Wohl (2013), permanent job losers have lower job nding rates than other types
of job losers and variations in this fraction therefore reect changes in average search e¢ ciency. This
fraction increases from 23 percent prior to the recession in 2007 to 45 percent by early 2010. Thereafter
it gradually declines towards its pre-recession level. It therefore mirrors quite precisely the matching
function residual implied by the shock to the heterogeneity in search e¢ ciency that we estimate.
Figure 9 illustrates the impact of the shocks on the level of unemployment, the number unemployed
workers out of work for 6 months or more (relative to the labor force), and on vacancies. In Section
2 we argued that the large drop in the job nding rate and its very slow recovery thereafter are key
for understanding the severity of the Great Recession. A key focus of our analysis is therefore whether
the model can account for this response of the job nding rate to the two labor market shocks just
discussed. The answer to this is a¢ rmative: Not only does the model reproduce the timing and the size
of the fall in the job nding rate, but it is also consistent with the very persistent nature of the declining
job nding prospects. Moreover, we nd that the model accounts very closely for the adjustments in
unemployment and vacancies. As in the U.S. data, the level of unemployment surges in 2008 while the
number of vacancies implodes. Thereafter the increase in unemployment dissipates only very slowly over
time while vacancies recover slightly faster. The results demonstrate that the amplication mechanism
discussed in the previous sections is quantitatively important.
Figure 9 also reports the share of longer term unemployed (the number of unemployed workers out
of employment for 6 months or more as a share of the total number of unemployed). This share soared
during the recession increasing from 15 percent prior to the recession to above 40 percent during 2010-
2012. The benchmark economy is consistent with the rise in the incidence of longer term unemployment
in the early part of the recession and with the very stubborn nature of the rise in this labor market
indicator. The model, however, is not fully able to account for the size of the rise in the incidence of
longer term unemployment since the peak in the share of longer term unemployed workers in the model
economy is just below 30 percent which is smaller and occurs earlier than in the U.S. data. Nevertheless,
the model does generate a signicant shift in the composition of the unemployed towards unemployment
states with longer duration.
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Finally, the bottom left panel of Figure 9 displays the conditional standard deviation of income one
month ahead for currently employed workers, scaled by the current level of income.22 This is a measure
of the income uncertainty in the model which partly is endogenous as it depends on the job nding
rate. We nd that income uncertainty surges during 2008 and remains at an elevated level until 2013,
after which it decreases somewhat. Recall that there is little amplication of the shocks in the exible
price model. Therefore, by comparing with the corresponding measure in the economy without nominal
rigidities we can evaluate the endogenous component of this uncertainty measure. We nd that income
uncertainty rises signicantly less in the exible price economy than in the benchmark model especially
in the early part of the recession (the rise in income uncertainty by early 2009 is almost twice as large
in the benchmark economy as in the exible price version of the model). It follows that the model
produces an important endogenous and countercyclical source of income uncertainty.
Combining the implications for the impact of the labor market shocks on unemployment and on
job vacancies produces the Beveridge curve illustrated in Figure 10. In the U.S. economy, there was
a rapid slide down the Beveridge curve in the early part of the recession followed by an outward shift
of this relationship and a gradual recovery in both indicators. Such counter-clockwise Beveridge curve
movements are not unusual during recessions but the current episode is more dramatic than what is
observed during most other recessions. We nd that the model accounts very accurately for both the
movement down the Beveridge curve that occurred in 2008-2009 and the subsequent outward shift of
the Beveridge curve.
One might wonder about the extent to which job separation shocks and shocks to the search e¢ ciency
matter individually for these results. To understand this, Figures 8 and 9 also display the paths of the
relevant aggregates when we assume that the U.S. economy was hit only by job separation shocks. In
the absence of shocks to the ows of workers to the two search e¢ ciency states, the model can account
for the initial rise in unemployment in late 2008 and for the initial drop in vacancies. However, the
shocks to search e¢ ciency are key for understanding both the size and the persistence of the rise in
unemployment and for the very long and deep decline in job vacancies. In addition when we exclude
the shocks to 't and to !t, the model produces only a very minor increase in the share of longer term
unemployed workers and little change in income uncertainty post 2010. This demonstrates that an
increase in heterogeneity amongst the unemployed is important for accounting for both the severity of
the Great Recession and for the surge in the incidence of longer term unemployment.
22To compute the conditional standard deviations we use a Gauss-Hermite approximation with 36 nodes. We do not
plot the uncertainty measure for the full insurance version of the model, as it is close to zero throughout the sample.
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We can go further in understanding the mechanisms by examining the results when eliminating
frictions in goods or nancial markets. When we assume that prices are exible, the labor market
shocks leave vacancies almost una¤ected. For that reason, the worsening labor market conditions have
a much smaller impact on unemployment than in the data and lead to a very minor rise in the incidence
of longer term unemployment. Perhaps most strikingly, the exible price model implies an extremely
counterfactual horizontal Beveridge curve. Interestingly, the model with insurance against idiosyncratic
shocks generates very similar results to the exible price model. The labor market shocks have minor
impact on aggregate goods demand in this economy and for that reason rms have little incentive to
post fewer vacancies in the wake of the worsening labor market conditions. The end result is a limited
increase in unemployment, a minor increase in the incidence of longer term unemployment, and a very
counterfactual horizontal Beveridge curve.
The key lesson we take away from this analysis is that the amplication mechanism derives from the
combination of frictions in goods, labor and nancial markets. Focusing on each of these frictions in
isolation may not be informative about the joint e¤ects and this potentially explains why past research
has concluded against the importance of labor market shocks for macroeconomic uctuations. It is
important to stress that the shocks to search heterogeneity are not directly responsible for longer term
unemployment incidence. When we assume either risk sharing within large households or fully exible
prices, these shocks are e¤ectively neutralized because they either have little impact on goods demand
(when assuming risk sharing) or are not transmitted to vacancy postings (when assuming exible prices).
5 Extensions and Robustness Analysis
In this section we investigate four further issues. We rst analyze further the sources of heterogeneity
in search e¢ ciency amongst the unemployed. Next, we examine the importance of the downward inex-
ible wage assumption and we look at how the monetary policy response matters for the amplication
mechanism. Finally, we compare the results for the Great Recession with those for the early 1990s
recession.
Search E¢ ciency Heterogeneity: Amplication vs. Propagation. An important feature of
our model is the heterogeneity in search e¢ ciency amongst the unemployed. It is this aspect of the
model that allows us to address the substantial increase in the incidence of longer term unemployment
which has occurred during the Great Recession. Above we also argued that this feature is important
for accounting for the magnitude of the increase in unemployment and for its persistence.
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Our analysis allows for heterogeneity in search activity to materialize either upon job loss or during
an unemployment spell (due to negative duration dependence). These two sources of heterogeneity
in search e¢ ciency play distinct roles. Heterogeneity in job search e¢ ciency upon job loss impacts
on employed workersconsumption and savings decisions directly, cf. the Euler equation (38). When
employed workers perceive higher risk of owing directly into the low search e¢ ciency state should
they lose their job, they increase their desired precautionary savings. Increased risk of loss of search
e¢ ciency during an unemployment spell instead impacts on the average job nding rate but does not
directly inuence employed workers savings choices and is therefore not directly important for the
amplication mechanism. Negative duration dependence instead may act as a propagation mechanism
through which temporary increases in the number of job losers has persistent e¤ects because the pool
of newly unemployed workers risk experiencing a loss in their search e¢ ciency during an unemployment
spell.
We now wish to understand the extent to which the two ows separately have been important for the
labor market dynamics during the Great Recession. Figure 11 repeats the Great Recession experiment
from the previous section under two alternative scenarios. In the rst of these we assume that the
probability of search e¢ ciency loss during an unemployment spell, !t, remains constant during the Great
Recession and equal to its steady-state value of ! = 21:9 percent per month. This experiment informs
about the importance of changes in the two sources of heterogeneity for the labor market outcomes. In
the second experiment we set ! = 0 so that negative duration dependence is eliminated altogether so
that heterogeneity in search e¢ ciency derives solely from heterogeneous job nding prospects upon job
loss.
We nd that the path of the economy generated when assuming !t = ! is very similar to the one in
which we allow for both sources of changes in the extent of heterogeneity. This similarity relates both
to the share of longer term unemployed workers and to the level of unemployment. Thus, increased
heterogeneity in job nding prospects upon unemployment is quantitatively much more important than
increased negative duration dependence. This result derives from the impact on precautionary savings
discussed above and it is consistent with the ndings of Ahn and Hamilton (2014) who - studying
CPS data - nd that recessions are times when there is an increased inow of workers with low job
nding probabilities into unemployment. Our results go one step further and demonstrate that such
a compositional change is important for the severity of the Great Recession because of its impact on
aggregate demand.
We also nd only a moderate e¤ect of eliminating negative duration dependence altogether (! = 0)
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which indicates that the propagation mechanism that derives from workers experiencing a loss of search
e¢ ciency during an unemployment spell is rather limited. The reason for this is that our calibration
implies that type s workers nd jobs quite fast (within 1.5 months on average in the steady-state) and
face a quite small risk of a loss of search e¢ ciency. Indeed, in the steady-state a type s unemployed
worker only faces a 13 percent risk of experiencing a transition to state l during an unemployment
spell. This risk is too small to matter much quantitatively. It follows that in the setting we examine,
heterogeneity in search e¢ ciency upon job loss is much more important for macroeconomic outcomes
than negative duration dependence.
The Role of Wage Flexibility. We have assumed that real wages are downward inexible. This
assumption appears consistent with Figure 12 which shows that while the average real compensation
per hour worked in the Business Sector grew by approximately 25 percent from the mid-1990s to the
beginning of 2007, real wages have remained unchanged since the onset of the Great Recession. We
will now ask two questions: First, to which extent do our results depend on this rigidity? Secondly, are
there circumstances under which a lack of a fall in real wages may arise as an equilibrium outcome?
In order to investigate these issues we assume that wages are determined according to a non-
cooperative Nash bargaining game between rms and workers. We assume that in new matches, once
workers and rms have been matched (but before a wage has been agreed upon), a worker enters the
two unemployment pools with probability 's;t and 1   'l;t, respectively, in exactly the same manner
as a worker who enters unemployment from an existing match.23 This assumption combined with the
borrowing constraint, makes the outcome under Nash bargaining particularly simple because the wage
o¤ered to a new worker is independent of their unemployment state.
We report results for a wide range of values of the workersbargaining power which includes both
Hagedorn and Manovskiis (2008) calibration of workers receiving 5 percent of the match surplus to
traditionalvalues of this parameter of 50 percent. Figure 13 illustrates the impact of a job separation
shock on unemployment and on real wages. We report the maximum increase in unemployment relative
to the corresponding value in the benchmark model. Similarly, we show the maximum decline in the
real wage as a percentage of the steady-state real wage.24
We nd that higher bargaining power on the part of workers implies higher wage exibility in
23Alternatively, one can assume that workers retain their unemployment status but in this case the equilibrium would
entail one-period wage dispersion which seems unreasonable.
24We assume that workers enjoy leisure when unemployed and calibrate the utility value of leisure so that the steady-state
equilibrium real wage implies a 5 percent unemployment rate.
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equilibrium and a signicantly smaller maximum response of unemployment. For example, when workers
and rms have the same bargaining power, the maximum response of unemployment is less than 25
percent of the corresponding response in the benchmark economy. Low values of the workersbargaining
power instead imply similar responses to labor market shocks to those we found when assuming inexible
real wages.
To understand these results, consider the impact of an increase in the job separation rate on the joint
surplus. A higher job separation rate lowers the value of a lled job because it increases the probability
that an existing match is terminated. It also lowers workersoutside option because of its impact on
the job nding rate. Hence, the joint match surplus declines and this puts a downward pressure on real
wages which relieves the pressure on rms to cut vacancy postings. The higher the workersbargaining
power, the larger is the fall in real wages and the smaller is the decline in vacancy postings. Whether the
increase in job separations impact mostly on real wages or on vacancy postings matters for employed
workerssavings choices because the former of these have no impact on the precautionary savings motive
since it has no idiosyncratic risk component. For that reason, the amplication mechanism is neutralized
when workers have a large bargaining power but not for low values of this parameter.
As we have noted above, real wages did not decline much, if at all, during the Great Recession.
The results presented here imply that this may either be consistent with workers have little bargaining
power or with real wages are downward inexible. These two alternative scenarios have very similar
implications for equilibrium quantities and would therefore be di¢ cult to disentangle empirically.
The Role of Monetary Policy. It is standard intuition in the monetary economics literature that
aggressive responses of nominal interest rates to ination can neutralize the ine¢ ciencies that derive from
nominal rigidities while too weak responses to ination produce locally indeterminate equilibria. It is
unclear whether similar results should be expected to hold in the heterogenous agents model considered
in the current paper but the strength of the amplication mechanism implies that the monetary policy
response may potentially be very important.
In order to investigate this issue, Figure 14 reports the impact of job separation rate shocks on
unemployment as a function of two key parameters,  and .25  determines the response of the
nominal interest rate to deviations of ination from its target while  determines the extent to which
workers respond to employment risk. We indicate by di¤erent colors the amplication of the labor
market shocks in the benchmark economy by normalizing the maximum impact on unemployment of
25The results for mismatch shocks are nearly identical so we do not report them here.
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the job separation shock with the equivalent response in a exible price economy. A dark blue color
means no amplication relative to the exible price economy with lighter shades of blue and yellow
and orange colors indicating ever increasing degrees of amplication. The white area corresponds to
combinations of  and  that are inconsistent with local determinacy of the equilibrium where ination
is on target.
We nd that su¢ ciently aggressive monetary policy rules succeed in neutralizing the amplication
mechanism while interest rate rules similar to those typically assumed in the New Keynesian literature
instead produce a large amount of amplication. In our calibration ( =  = 1:5), both shocks are
signicantly amplied but increasing  to around 2 neutralizes much of the amplication relative to
the exible price allocation. More aggressive of monetary policy responses provide stabilization by
moderating the agentsexpectations regarding the impact of the shocks on equilibrium ination and
vacancy postings and thus impact directly on the mechanism through which labor market shocks are
amplied.
Our results also show that higher degrees of risk aversion demand more aggressive policy rules in
order to provide stabilization and that, the higher is the degree of risk aversion, the more aggressive
has the interest rate rule to be in order to ensure local indeterminacy of the intended equilibrium.
These features derive from the impact of risk aversion on precautionary savings. When agents are
more risk averse, there is a stronger impact of labor market uncertainty on precautionary savings which
motivates the need for a more aggressive monetary policy stance in order to stabilize the economy.26 In
the indeterminacy region, equilibria can exist in which agentsexpectations of worsening labor market
outcomes and low ination drives down aggregate demand thereby motivating rms to hire less labor
and leading the economy to a high-unemployment-cum-low-ination self-fullling equilibria. Thus, the
design of the monetary reaction function is critical in the incomplete markets set-up analyzed in this
paper.
The Early 1990s Recession. An important check on the extent to which the mechanisms that we
have emphasized are important can be conducted by applying the analysis to other recessions. For this
reason we now examine the early 1990s recession. This recession witnessed a more shallow contraction
in output, an increase in the unemployment rate from 5 percent 1989 to above 7 percent in 1992
(a smaller increase than during the Great Recession) and a moderate increase (minor relative to the
26 also impacts on the determinacy region in standard New Keynesian models, see e.g. Gali (2008), but only because it
impacts on the response of consumption to real interest rates. In our model, a more important source of impact is through
precautionary savings.
27
Great Recession) in the share of longer term unemployment (see Figures 2 and 3). Similarly to the
Great Recession, the early 1990s recession was associated with an increase in the job loss rate and a
persistent decline in the job nding rate. Thus, there are similarities but also interesting di¤erences
between the Great Recession and the early 1990s recession.
One issue that we must confront when applying the model to the early 1990s recession is that
we do not have access to the same data as those that we used to estimate the shocks for the Great
Recession because we relied on JOLTS data for the layo¤ rate and for the number of job openings. We
follow Shimer (2005) and estimate the job termination rate on the basis of CPS measures of the number
of unemployed workers with duration below 5 months.27 We use Barnichons (2010) estimate of the
composite help wanted indexto derive a measure of vacancies.28
Using these data we then repeat the exercise from Section 4.2 estimating the labor market shocks
and computing counterfactual paths of the key variables. Figure 15 illustrates the estimates of the job
separation shock and the search heterogeneity shocks for the early 1990s recession. The increase in the
estimated job separation rate is marginally smaller than what was observed in the Great Recession but
very persistent. The heterogeneity shock instead is very small relative to the Great Recession and we
actually nd a small reduction in the fraction of workers that ow into the low search e¢ ciency state
from mid-1990 to mid-1991. This coincides with a small improvement in matching e¢ ciency in the early
part of the recession. From mid-1991 matching e¢ ciency worsens and we nd a moderate increase in
the fraction of workers owing into low search e¢ ciency.29
Figure 16 illustrates the counterfactual paths for unemployment, vacancies, the share of longer term
unemployed, the job nding rate and the measure of income risk discussed earlier. The benchmark model
matches the data very well in terms of the paths of unemployment and vacancies. It also accounts for
the decline in the job nding rate in the early part of the 1990s recession but not quite for the extent
of the fall in the job nding rate from 1992 to 1994. By contrast, when we assume either exible prices
or lack of idiosyncratic income risk, the model implies little rise in unemployment and that vacancies
and the job nding rate increase rather than fall. Thus, the amplication mechanism that we have
discussed appears to be just as important for understanding the early 1990s recession as for the Great
Recession. However, as anticipated, an important di¤erence between these two recessions is that the
27We correct for the redesign of the CPS in 1994 using the adjustment proposed in Elsby, Michaels and Solon (2009).
28We scale Barnichons composite index with the post 1970 index and we linearly detrend the data.
29We do not show the fraction of permanent job losers for this period, as this data series is only available from 1994
onwards.
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search heterogeneity shock appears of little importance for the 1990s recession since the countercyclical
paths of the economy are very similar with and without allowing for this shock.
Figure 17 illustrates the Beveridge curves. The data indicate that the US economy experienced a
slide down followed by an outward shift of the Beveridge curve during the 1990s recession much like
what was witnessed during the Great Recession. However, both the movement along the Beveridge
curve and the outward shift were much smaller in the earlier of these two recessions. The benchmark
model again manages to account very well for these joint dynamics in unemployment and vacancies
with the di¤erence vis-à-vis the Great Recession being that the heterogeneity shock is not important
for the extent to which the model provides a good t to the Beveridge curve dynamics.
We conclude from this that the central amplication mechanism that we have stressed - the decline in
aggregate demand due to labor market risks and its transmission to the supply side - is equally important
for the early 1990s recession as we claim it is for the Great Recession. The main contrast between these
two recessions was that the search heterogeneity shock was not important for the early 1990 recession.
For that reason, according to our results, this recession witnessed little rise in longer term unemployment
and a smaller rise in idiosyncratic income uncertainty which meant that this recession produced less
dramatic outcomes for the economy. Yet, in the absence of idiosyncratic income uncertainty or in the
presence of exible prices, the early 1990s recession would barely have increased unemployment.
6 Conclusions and Summary
We have shown how frictions in labor markets that interact with goods and nancial markets frictions
can lead to a signicant amplication of labor market shocks in a general equilibrium framework. At
the heart of our theory is the idea that labor market shocks that produce job uncertainty can reduce
aggregate goods demand because of precautionary savings. A calibrated version of the model can
account not only for the increase in unemployment observed in the U.S. during the Great Recession but
also for much of the movements in the Beveridge curve. It is the transmission of weak aggregate demand
to aggregate supply that produces these results because of an endogenous amplication mechanism.
Our emphasis on job uncertainty deriving from idiosyncratic employment risk and uncertain out-
comes of labor market search o¤ers an additional route through which macroeconomic uncertainty can
impact on the economy. Much recent literature has focused upon uncertainty shocks deriving from
changes in the volatility of aggregate variables (such as TFP or policy related variables) and shown that
such uncertainty can be important for understanding aggregate uctuations, see e.g. Bloom (2009). As
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Carroll and Dunn (1997) we have instead focused on the idiosyncratic uncertainty implications of rst
moment shocks to job loss and job nding probabilities. We plan in future work to further examine the
importance of this channel using micro level data on consumption and labor supply.
Our theory has abstracted from aggregate savings and we imposed that workers cannot go into debt.
These assumptions are appealing from a computational perspective but it would be interesting to relax
them both so that one can also evaluate the impact on aggregate savings and investment. It would also
be interesting to investigate the impact of unemployment insurance policies. Unemployment insurance
duration is usually extended during U.S. recessions and the Great Recession is no exception to this.
Our exercise does take this into account because we focus entirely upon recessions and the calibration
of the level of benets targets Hurd and Rohwedders (2010) estimates of the consumption loss due to
unemployment shocks during the Great Recession. Yet, it would be of interest to investigate further
how such cyclical variations in unemployment benets impact on the aggregate outcomes. We plan to
pursue each of these issues in future work.
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7.1 Appendix 1: Solving and simulating the model
From the no-borrowing constraint it follows that, in equilibrium, the individual workersconsumption
levels are given as cul = cus =  and cn = w. We can then reduce the model down to a core dynamic
subsystem of only three equations: the households Euler equation for bonds, Equation (38), the rms
pricing condition, Equation (39) and the monetary policy rule, Equation (29), which can be written as:
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We use this dynamic system of three equations, together with the exogenous shock processes, to solve
for the equilibrium laws of motions of s;t, Rt and t using a standard perturbation method.
30 We can
then simulate these variables for a given time path of the exogenous shocks.
Simulations of the remaining variables are obtained using the original nonlinear equations. Given
a simulation for s;t, Rt and t and the shocks, we can use Equations (22)-(23) directly to obtain
simulations for t and  t. Next we jointly use Equations (20)-(21) and (25)-27) to recursively nd
the simulation paths for mt, ua;t, nt, us;t and ul;t; given initial conditions for us;t and ul;t. To nd
the time path for vacancies and the unemployment rate, we use the condition that vt = t=ua;t and
ut = 1   nt. The average job nding rate is computed as mtut 1+t 1nt 1 . Finally, a simulation for
the share of unemployed for 6 months or less is obtained by recursively keeping track of the mass of
unemployed in each of the two states by duration, ranging from 1 to 6 months.
7.2 Appendix 2: Retrieving shocks from the data
We retrieve the search e¢ ciency shocks z';t and z!;t from the data using an iterative accounting
procedure based on only the models labor market transition equations and the matching function.
Importantly, the values of the shocks are found independently of the model solution for s;t, rt and t:
Thus, key features of the models amplication mechanism such as the degrees of price stickiness, risk
aversion and market incompleteness have no impact on the values of the shocks we retrieve from the
data.
30This is done after substituting out l;t = qs;t in the Euler equation and exploiting that the term
y0
y
drops out under
a rst-order approximation of the model around a steady- state with  = 0.
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Our procedure is based on three data series: (i) the civilian unemployment rate from the BLS, (ii)
the layo¤ rate from JOLTS, and (iii) the number of job openings from JOLTS. The rst step is to
retrieve a time series for the number of active searchers, ua;t, from the data. To this end, we re-write
the matching function, Equation (20), as:
mt = %

ua;t
ut 1

(ut 1) (vt)1  :
and note that

ua;t
ut 1

is the time-varying residual of an aggregate matching function that abstracts
from heterogeneity. Thus, a by-product we obtain a time series for the aggregate matching function
residual and the shocks we back out map exactly into this residual.
To proceed, we rearrange the above equation to obtain an expression for ua;t:
ua;t = ut 1
et
%
1= vt
ut 1
1 1=
where et  mtut 1 = 1 ut (1 t 1)(1 ut 1)ut 1 . Given time series for ut; t and vt we can evaluate the entire
right-hand side of the above equation. For consistency with the models steady state, we take the log
of both sides of the equation and subtract the mean, which gives:
bua;t = but 1 + 1= bet + (1  1=) (bvt   but 1)
where a hat denotes a log deviation from the mean.31 We then construct a time series for the fraction
of active searchers as ua;t = eua+bua;t ; where ua is the steady-state level of active searchers in the model.
Given ua;t we can compute the job nding rate among searchers in each period:
s;t =
mt
ua;t
= etut 1ua;t
which also gives a time series for l;t = qs;t. Next, we back out the shocks using the following iterative
procedure:
1. Start at t = 1, initializing us;0 and ul;0 are at their steady-state levels.
2. Using our proportionality assumption !t = (!='l)'l;t and 's;t 1 = 1 'l;t 1; re-write equation
(21) to obtain an expression for 'l;t 1 :
'l;t 1 =
ua;t   us;t 1   x;t 1nt 1   qul;t 1
  (!=l)us;t 1   x;t 1nt 1 + q (!=l)us;t 1 + qx;t 1nt 1
31The scalings parameter % drops out of the equation. The matching parameter  is set to 0:65, to be consistent with
our model calibration.
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Evaluate the right-hand side to obtain 'l;t 1, and compute the implied values of !t 1 and 's;t 1:
3. Use Equations (27) and (27) to compute us;t and ul;t.
4. Set t = t+ 1 and go back to step 2 until t = T:
5. Once the time series for 'l;t and !t have been obtained, back out z';t and z!;t from Equations
(33) and (34).
Our procedure uses data over the period January 2003 until August 2014.
7.3 Appendix 3: The Nash bargaining problem
Under the assumptions discussed in the main text, the Nash Bargaining solution satises:


 
= (1  ) [V (b; e;S) 'lV (b; l;S)  (1 'l)V (b; s;S)] =U
0
(w);
where  is the bargaining power of the worker and  is the surplus of a match to an entrepreneur, which
is equal to the (expected) resource cost of hiring a new worker. The term between square brackets on the
right-hand side is the surplus of a match to a household, which equals the di¤erence between the value
obtained in an employment relationship, V (b; e;S) ; minus the expected value outside the relationship,
'lV (b; l;S) + (1 'l)V (b; s;S). The multiplicative term U0(w) on the right-hand side converts the
utility surplus of the employed worker into units of resources using her marginal utility.
To solve the model, we add the Nash bargaining condition to the system of equations, as well as
the worker value expressions, Equations (4)-(6), setting c = w for the employed workers value and
c =  for the unemployed workers of each type. The latter requirement follows from the borrowing
constraint b  0 which implies that as in the baseline modelworkers consume their current-period
income streams.
Relative to the baseline model, the system to be solved thus contains four additional equations (value
functions for the three worker types and the Nash Bargaining condition) and four additional variables
(worker values for the three types and the real wage). We solve this model using rst-order perturbation
on the entire system of model equations.
7.4 Appendix 4. The Hazard Function
We calibrate = (';!;q;s) by targeting a 15 percent steady-state share of workers out of employment
with a duration of unemployment of 6 months or more, a steady-state monthly job nding probability
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of 43 percent, and the hazard function implied by Kroft et als (2013) estimates. These authors estimate
the hiring probability of individuals out of work for d months at date t using a polynomial specication
for the hazard:
t (t; d) = A (d)m0
1 
t
A (d) = (1  a1   a2) + a1e b1d + a2e b2d
Using panel data from the CPS for the 2002-2007 sample their estimates are ba1 = 0:314, ba2 = 0:393,bb1 = 1:085 and bb2 = 0:055. Third, we introduce information on duration dependence from Kroft et
als (2013) estimate of the relationship between hiring probabilities and the length of an unemployment
spell. These authors estimate the hiring probability of individuals out of work for d months at date t
using a polynomial specication for the hazard. In particular, they assume that the job nding rate
depends on the length of the unemployment spell and on labor market tightness as:
t (t; d) = A (d)m0
1 
t
A (d) = (1  a1   a2) + a1e b1d + a2e b2d
Using panel data from the CPS for the 2002-2007 sample for d going up to 15 months (and controlling for
demographic variables), Kroft et al (2013) estimate ba1 = 0:314, ba2 = 0:393, bb1 = 1:085 and bb2 = 0:055.
We calibrate  by minimizing the quadratic form:
W =

 ()  target0  ()  target
where  () are the model implied moments and target are the targets just listed. The minimization
problem delivers the estimates  = (0:229;0:219;0:468;0:586). The gure below illustrates the
implied hazard function along with Kroft et als (2013) estimates.
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Figure A.1: Hazard function
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7.5 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Targets and Parameter Values
Targets
0.05 unemployment rate (u)
0.586 job nding rate among searchers (s)
0.045 s.s. hiring cost as a fraction of the quarterly wage (  4w )
0.15 fraction of long-term unemployed (> 6 months)
0.117 consumption loss upon unemployment ( w )
0 net ination rate ()
0.05 annual net interest rate (R12 1)
5 average price duration (in months) in equivalent version with Calvo pricing
Parameter Values
 96.9 price adjustment cost parameter
 6 elast. subst. goods varieties
 0.992 discount factor
 1.5 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
 1.5 interest rate rule parameter on ination
 0.039 steady state job termination rate
 0.91 persistence parameter termination rate
100= 0.667 std. dev.  shock as a percentage of 
'l 0.229 steady state fraction of job losers into s-pool
! 0.219 steady state fraction from s-pool to l-pool
' 0.99 persistence of shocks to fraction of job losers into l-pool
100'='l 7.20 std. dev. 'l shock as a percentage of 'l
! 0.99 persistence of shocks to fraction from s-pool to l-pool
100!=! 7.20 std. dev. ! shock as a percentage of !
 0.19 matching e¢ ciency parameter
q 0.468 probability of search for unemployed in l-pool
w 0.830 real wage
 0.65 matching function elasticity
 0.733 unemployment benet
R  1 0.004 steady-state net nominal interest rate
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Table 2: Stationary State Values
Parameter Value Meaning
cn 0.830 consumption employed
cu;s 0.733 consumption unemployed in s-pool
cu;l 0.733 consumption unemployed in l-pool
s 0.586 job nding rate unemployed in s-pool
l 0.274 job nding rate unemployed in l-pool
us 0.017 mass in s-pool
ul 0.033 mass in l-pool
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Figure 1: The US Civilian Unemployment Rate
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Figure 2: Estimates of Job Separation and Job Finding Rates
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Figure 3: Share of unemployed workers who have been out of work for 6 months or more
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Figure 4: Average Unemployment Duration and Estimates from Job Finding Rates
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Figure 5: The Beveridge Curve
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Figure 6: The Impact of Job Separation Shocks
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Figure 7: The Impact of Search Heterogeneity Shocks
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Figure 8: The Great Recession: Shocks
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Figure 9: The Great Recession
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Figure 10: Actual and Counterfactual Beveridge Curves: 2007-2014
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Figure 11: The Importance of Di¤erent Sources of Heterogeneity
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Figure 12: Real hourly compensation
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Figure 13: The Importance of Increased Duration Dependence
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Figure 14: Monetary Policy and Amplication
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Figure 15: Early 1990s Recession: Shocks
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Figure 16: Early 1990s Recession
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Figure 17: Actual and Counterfactual Beveridge Curves: 1990-1995
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